The Next Generation C-sUAS Missile project comes as the U.S. and other nations are pursuing lasers, microwaves and other alternatives to kinetic anti-drone weapons, such as missiles and cannon, which are seen as too expensive and in short supply.

The Army wants to quickly develop an “extended-range, quick-response missile to defeat Group 2 and Group 3 small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) threats,” according to the Army’s Sources Sought notice. The deadline is August 20.

The initial specifications are for a missile that can intercept a drone flying at 6 kilometers altitude, at a range of more than 16 kilometers. The ultimate goal is to destroy drones flying 8 kilometers high, at a range of more than 25 kilometers. Missile guidance would be via a radar seeker.

NGCM appears intended as a step up — but still compatible — with the Army’s Coyote C-UAS missile system.

“The Army is looking for NGCM to be produced and integrated into the existing Coyote Launch System to provide extended range, rapid launch time, and reduced time-to-target over current effectors,” the notice said.

The weapon is intended to stop Group 2 and 3 drones. Group 2 drones have a maximum gross takeoff weight of 21 to 55 pounds, fly below 3,500 feet and have a speed of less than 250 knots, according to the Department of Defense’s UAV classification system. This includes models such as Boeing’s ScanEagle. Group 3 drones, such as Insitu’s RQ-21 Blackjack, have a takeoff weight under 1,320 pounds and fly below 18,000 feet at a speed of less than 250 knots.

The NGCM missile should take less than five seconds to leave the launcher after the operator gives the fire command.

“The missile must be compatible with the Coyote Launcher with minimal to no modifications,” the notice said.

In addition, the missile must also fit with existing air defense systems, including the Sentinel A3/A4, LTAMDS and TPQ-53 radars.

The Army envisions the NGCM missile system in two versions. The fixed-site version would be equipped with a variety of sensors. A mobile version would be “mounted on tactical vehicles for employment at the halt and on-the-move, providing a scalable capability at the tactical edge.”

The Army is aiming for Technology Readiness Level 7 — prototype testing in the field — by the end of fiscal 2027. Contractors will need to have 50 missiles ready for operational assessment by the beginning of 2028.

Significantly, the Army desires missiles costing less than $150,000 apiece as part of a bulk purchase of 5,000 missiles. While that’s a bargain compared to a $4 million Patriot air-defense missile, critics may still question the economics: An Iranian Shahed-136 drone costs around $35,000.

That’s one reason for the drive to develop anti-drone lasers that, theoretically, cost only pennies per shot. On the other hand, missiles can function in bad weather that disrupts laser beams.

“The current industrial base has demonstrated significant challenges, including production delays, quality control issues, and critical obsolescence (i.e., diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages) across key engine components,” warned the Air Force’s Request for Information. The deadline is Aug. 28.

“The government will pursue a strategic competition requiring industry to innovate manufacturing and guarantee supply chain resiliency,” the RFI said.

The initiative comes as the Air Force struggles with its jet engines.

For example, F-35 fighter deliveries and upgrades have been delayed by engine issues, with a Government Accountability Office report noting last year that “the engine contractor is still not delivering engines to contract specifications after 20 years of production.”

Meanwhile, B-52 modernization has been stalled in part by engine issues that have raised costs by $3 billion and delayed initial operational capability by 15 months, according to GAO.

In turn, the Air Force is now embarking on a multiyear fighter engine procurement project that envisions more than 180 engines per year by 2034. The RFI specifically cites engines for the F-15EX and F-16.

The RFI promises “five foundational pillars designed to drive a paradigm shift in engine procurement and sustainment,” as the government shifts from “legacy procurement toward incentivizing industry-led technological evolution and capacity expansion.” These include “holding vendors accountable” for delivering new engines that are more capable, reliable and cheaper.

The Air Force will focus “on the total lifecycle cost of the engine, not just the initial purchase price.”

Contractors are also responsible for ensuring reliable supply chains.

“We will implement an acquisition strategy that prioritizes ease of maintenance and establishes a resilient, sustainable supply chain from day one,” the Air Force said. “This effort is designed to solve key fleet-level issues by requiring a newer engine with improved supportability.”

“The result is a streamlined logistics footprint that reduces downtime, lowers the burden on our maintainers, and ensures the continuous flow of parts and support to maximize flightline readiness.”

Ultimately, the question is whether the U.S. defense industrial base can deliver. The Air Force intends to “enforce stringent producibility requirements.”

“We will select a partner capable of scaling production to meet surge requirements, guaranteeing a steady and uninterrupted supply of engines for USAF/FMS [Foreign Military Sales] aircraft (e.g. F-15EX and F-16) programs,” the RFI reads.

Companies responding to the RFI are asked to provide a variety of details, such as a timeline for developing and manufacturing an engine. They should also specify “at what minimum volume your supply chain can justify private capital investments (such as facility expansion, tooling modernization, or advanced automation) and how those investments will structurally lower your long-term unit costs.”

With nations competing to obtain raw materials — and China restricting sales of rare earths — the Air Force wants to be certain manufacturers can find the raw materials they need.

“From your company’s market perspective, what are the primary raw material constraints (e.g., specialized titanium/nickel alloys) or manufacturing process bottlenecks (e.g., advanced casting or forging capacity) that pose the highest risk to scaling up fighter engine production?” the RFI asks.

But as America celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, it is easy to forget that independence was not guaranteed. As they shivered at Valley Forge in the winter of 1778, George Washington and his troops would have scoffed at the notion that victory would come on a silver platter.

For the American Revolution to succeed, the colonists had to create an army. Whether the Continental Army was defeated on the battlefield — as it frequently was — mattered less. As long as the United Colonies could keep an army in the field, Britain would be forced to continue what seemed like a forever war.

“American Revolutionary War” is a computer wargame that depicts the battles of the American Revolution, or what the British call the War of American Independence.

With 148 scenarios, from small engagements like Hubbardton and Kettle Creek, to larger battles such as Princeton, Brandywine and Saratoga, American Revolutionary War is part of publisher Wargame Design Studio’s Musket & Pike series. These games depict warfare from the 15th through the 18th Centuries, an era where polearms were gradually replaced by gunpowder weapons, such as muskets.

By the 1770s, the pike had been replaced by the bayonet, and the primitive arquebus by more reliable flintlock muskets including Britain’s “Brown Bess.”

With a 114-page user manual, American Revolutionary War is not exactly casual entertainment. It is a highly detailed simulation not just of 18th Century European-style warfare — but also how difficult it was to conduct armies’ European-style warfare in the 18th Century North American wilderness.

The game depicts battles at the grand tactical scale, with battalions and companies of infantry, as well as batteries of artillery and the occasional horse soldier (cavalry was much rarer than the later Napoleonic and American Civil Wars). The American have Continental regulars and local militia, while the Crown fields a polyglot force of British regulars, German mercenaries, Loyalist troops and Native American allies.

These units maneuver across a 2-D hex-grid map of eastern North America in its pre-industrial glory. The terrain is studded with forests, fields, marshes and streams.

Units are rated for how many troops or guns they have, and their weaponry (musket, 3-pounder artillery, etc.). Most important is a quality rating from A to F, which affects combat proficiency and movement. The British regulars tend to be quality As and Bs, while the Continentals tend to be Cs and Ds, and the American militias Fs.

Players alternate taking their turns, with each turn representing about 15 minutes of real time. Each player conducts movement and fire combat, followed by a melee phase to resolve assaults. Combat inflicts casualties as well as “fatigue,” which saps morale and effectiveness until units break or rout.

Western battlefield tactics in the 18th and 19th Centuries centered on assuming the right formation in an era when troops fought shoulder to shoulder. Column formation was used to expedite movement, though at the cost of firepower and presenting a juicy target. When engaging in a firefight, infantry would assume line formation, standing in two or three ranks.

Units in line that move through rough terrain, or obstructions, such as walls, run the risk of becoming “disordered,” with movement and fire penalties. On the other hand, a densely packed column can take heavy casualties from enemy troops deployed in line. Dispersing troops into open order makes them less vulnerable to enemy fire, but penalizes them in melee.

One myth is that the conflict “was fought by the British in a strictly linear fashion, while the Americans were primarily in skirmish,” Mike Cox, designer of American Revolutionary War, told Military Times. Both sides were capable of assuming a variety of formations, though this presented challenges for under-trained Continentals.

“The Americans often tried to fight linearly, too,” added Cox. “It just didn’t often work out well.”

Particularly useful are the detachments of light infantry.

“Learning to master your light troops is extremely important,” Cox said. “When to deploy as skirmishers to delay or scout, or recall and use them to effectively melee to push back the enemy and take and hold ground.”

Command and control has always been the glue that binds armies, but especially so in the pre-radio era, when commanders personally led their troops.

American Revolutionary War features historical commanders, rated from A (George Washington) to F, that form chains of command in each army. Leaders can rally broken troops and provide morale bonuses, though they can also be felled by enemy fire.

“Keeping units in range of their leader and their leader in range of the next higher echelon makes an army work well,” Cox explained. American commanders will need to stay close to their militia: “Keeping them in command and preventing their disruption and breakdown is an art.”

One fascination of playing historical wargames is seeing how they model the little things. For example, the British Army’s Scottish Highlanders are given a bonus during melee combat “to reflect their impact on the minds of American troops, and their reputation for relishing close combat,” the game manual notes.

But ultimately, the question comes down to: How accurately does the game depict the battles that determined the fate of the American Revolution? And, how well does it capture the essences of a professional army versus a more amateur — but also more inspired — citizen army?

American Revolutionary War fares well on both questions.

The unit quality, morale and command systems model the capabilities of both sides, including how the Continental Army improved over time due to combat experience, as well as the tutelage of European instructors like Baron von Steuben.

“British forces are often outnumbered,” said Cox. “They need to learn to stretch their lines or get outflanked. They will usually have some high-quality troops and have the advantage of picking the point of attack.”

“The Americans usually have a high number of units. However, quality and strength can vary wildly. The Americans need to know when to give ground and when to hit hard.”

Perhaps what is most striking is the theater of war.

WDS has published almost 120 historical wargames that cover gigantic battles, such as Waterloo, Gettysburg, Kursk and the Battle of the Bulge. In these games, the maps are packed with masses of troops.

In American Revolutionary War, the maps are often big, while the armies are small. One can begin to appreciate how British soldiers and colonial settlers must have felt about fighting in a vast, untamed land.

As Americans mark the Declaration of Independence, this is a reminder of how far our nation has come.

Ukrainian F-16s have destroyed more than 2,500 Geran and Gerbera one-way attack drones, wrote airpower expert Justin Bronk in an analysis of the Ukraine air war for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

“[The] use of fighters against such drones has consumed an unsustainable number of airframe flying hours and air-to-air missiles … since mid-2024, when the Ukrainian Air Force received its first Western aircraft and trained crews,” the analysis reads.

“Russian industry produces more than 6,000 [one-way attack] drones per month, and fighter aircraft have only a finite number of airframe hours available before they need time consuming deep maintenance cycles to be performed at a factory by expert technicians.”

Ukraine’s fleet currently operates an estimated 39 F-16s, out of about 79 promised by various Western European nations. Ukraine also flies an estimated four Mirage 2000-5 fighters, out of up to 20 promised by France, plus a few Soviet-era Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters.

The F-16s have been a game changer in the Ukraine air war. They enable Ukraine’s small air force to launch stand-off attacks against ground targets using American-made JDAM and French-made AASM Hammer glide bombs. The threat they pose to Russia’s air force became evident earlier this month, when a Ukrainian F-16 reportedly downed an Su-35 over eastern Ukraine.

Ironically, the F-16 has proven such a capable aircraft that it has become a victim of its own success.

“The F-16 fleet has been over-tasked, mostly by C-UAS [counter-drone] interception duties, for which there is almost unlimited demand over time,” Bronk told Defense News.

The root of the dilemmas is that Ukraine is squeezed between multiple aerial threats.

In addition to drone strikes, Russia has launched numerous cruise and ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities. Russia has become adept at launching massive combined strikes that begin with waves of drones, followed by cruise missiles, such as the Kh-101, and then ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander-M and Kinzhal.

Ukraine has managed to at least partially tame the drone threat by creating dense belts of short-range air defenses, or SHORAD. These SHORAD belts combine short-range anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft guns, mobile machine gun teams and a variety of homegrown interceptor-drones.

The drawback there is maintaining dense SHORAD coverage along the 745-mile front line — plus defending cities in the rear — with short-range weapons.

“What unites all these mobile air defense teams and counter-drone teams is that their equipment and ammunition is relatively cheap and thus their operations are sustainable,” the RUSI analysis noted. “However, they are relatively personnel intensive to deploy at scale and require both force density and geographical depth to be effective.”

These limitations also point to the difficulties NATO would face in creating its own Ukrainian-style SHORAD system.

“NATO cannot replicate the density of SHORAD defenses that Ukraine deploys for C-UAS coverage, due to the huge personnel requirements of doing so on a sustainable basis,” Bronk told Defense News.

However, NATO could invest in radar-guided anti-aircraft guns to protect key installations, such as airbases and headquarters, and develop cheaper drone-killing munitions for aircraft such as the APKWS II rocket.

Nonetheless, this still leaves Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles, against which SHORAD is largely ineffective.

As with the U.S. and Israel versus Iran’s missiles, Ukraine must carefully manage limited stockpiles of air defense interceptors like the American-made Patriot and the European-made SAMP/T.

Ideally, Ukraine should rely on SHORAD to stop the drones, while reserving its F-16s for other missions, Bronk argues.

“Other systems need to be used wherever possible for [one-way attack] drones so that F-16 capacity can be used to intercept cruise missiles and deliver strike missions,” Bronk explained. “Within the Ukrainian Air Force inventory, it is by far the most efficient asset for this.”

Bronk believes that F-16 stand-off ground attacks could be even more effective — if Ukraine’s high command was less rigid.

“There is potential for the Ukrainian Air Force to have greater effects if squadrons and wings are given more authority to plan strikes themselves rather than being centrally tasked by Army-centric headquarters elements,” he said.

The Defense Department has put out a solicitation for robot boats that are capable of launching small attack drones — with technology mature enough to be deployed to the field within 120 days.

The goal for the Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads, or SWAP-USV, project is to find “mature, market-ready [unmanned surface vessels] fully integrated with two or more mature, market-ready aerial drones to detect, identify, track, and defeat hostile threats,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation. The call out set a response deadline of Aug. 10.

To make this happen, DIU created a year-long contest backed by $100 million in prize money. DIU wants to “partner with established maritime manufacturers, autonomy developers, sensor manufacturers, and UAS developers to execute a multi-phase Prize Challenge.”

The SWAP-USV project is billed as a solution to a problem that has also plagued missile and drone defense on land: the economics favor the offense.

“The cost-exchange ratio for detecting and neutralizing asymmetric maritime threats in contested environments is heavily skewed in favor of the adversary,” the DIU solicitation states. Nor can the U.S. military continue to rely “on exquisite, multi-million-dollar naval and aviation assets to intercept these inexpensive targets.”

The solicitation paints the picture of a drone boat that can carry, launch and control at least two small UAVs. The UAVs together should be capable of conducting kinetic strikes with a combined payload of at least 2 kilograms, or just over 4 pounds.

DIU wants a mix of recoverable and one-way attack drones that can patrol ocean, coastal and riverine waters, and loiter on station. The drones, according to the solicitation, should “support one or more operational effects, including ISR, comms relay, electronic warfare, payload delivery, or precision engagement of moving or stationary, as applicable, under operator command.”

The Pentagon also wants the system to be mobile enough to fit into a standard cargo container, on road trailers or on C-17 and C-130 transports.

“Solutions that can launch from unimproved locations or provide additional launch flexibility, i.e. remotely from a container, will be looked upon favorably,” DIU noted, adding that the UAVs should be “technically mature and have an established production line.”

Interestingly, among the maritime threats the DIU solicitation cites are “‘go-fast’ smuggling boats, and semi-submersibles.” Drug cartels have used semi-submersibles to transport contraband from South America to the U.S., and such pseudo-submarines are hard to detect.

The SWAP-USV project calls for robot craft capable of “autonomous surveillance and interdiction of defined maritime operating areas, maximizing operational coverage, probability of detection, interdiction effectiveness, and time on station while minimizing daily operating cost, logistics burden, and required personnel.”

The surveillance elements of the solicitation state that the drone boat must be able to “autonomously follow or shadow a vessel of interest, and autonomously intercept a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel. Autonomous execution of these functions is desired but not required.”

The SWAP-USV Challenge, meanwhile, comprises three “sprints,” or phases, each with separate prize money. To sweeten the pot further, companies that pass the test in each phase will be eligible for procurement contracts backed by a $200 million budget.

Sprint 1 calls for in-water testing in fall 2026, with a goal of deploying a system in the field within 120 days.

“Solutions must include a complete mission ready USV with integrated drone capability system available for testing and evaluation within 29 days of down-selection for Sprint 1,” the solicitation specified. There will be $40 million in prize money.

Sprint 2 will have a fall 2026 deadline and in-water testing in early 2027, with the focus on “expanded payloads, upgraded autonomy, and multi-vendor integrations.” The prize money for that timeframe will also be $40 million.

Sprint 3 will take submissions in early 2027, with in-water testing in summer 2027. The goals of this phase will be announced later, but there will be $20 million in prizes.

Companies must specify which phase they want to join. “The government reserves the right to assign applicants to [Sprint] cohorts based on technical and manufacturing maturity,” the solicitation noted.

But this time, the Pentagon is in a hurry. The Iran war has exposed the problem of relying on costly long-range missiles such as the Tomahawk. To remedy that, DoD is putting out a call for long-range, autonomously guided Ground-Based Affordable Mass, or GBAM, weapons that cost less than $250,000 apiece.

The Pentagon also wants the GBAM munitions to be ready for demonstration within three months, and full-scale production within 18 months.

The goal of the GBAM initiative is to supplement expensive smart munitions with “affordable, scalable long-range effects, and “enable commanders to service a broader target set, preserve exquisite munitions for their intended purpose, and sustain operational tempo throughout a prolonged conflict.”

To facilitate that, the Defense Innovation Unit has created the GBAM Challenge. Contestants will pitch ideas in the form of a pitch deck or white paper, with a deadline of Aug. 5.

Winning teams will be invited to a Phase II flight demonstration at a government test site in early November, where they will give a 30-minute presentation — and get a $250,000 cash prize.

The top Phase II contenders may receive up to $5 million “to immediately deliver operational test quantities to units.” They may also be eligible for other funds, including Prototype Other Transaction agreements, follow-on production contracts and Small Business Innovation Research awards.

“In total, the government has budgeted up to $250 million to support prize execution and follow-on transition activities associated with this effort,” DIU pointed out.

However, grabbing that pot of gold will require much work. For starters, the timeline is tight. The Pentagon wants “mature, affordable, long-range precision strike systems that can be demonstrated within 60 to 90 days, certified, and scaled into production within 12 to 18 months.”

DIU doesn’t specify whether GBAM will be a missile or a drone, though it does say GBAM will be “aligned with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) mandate to field low-cost autonomous capabilities at scale.”

Either way, the U.S. military wants a “favorable cost-per-effect at operationally relevant ranges while minimizing the logistical, training, and sustainment burden on employing units.” This means a ground-launched weapon with a range of at least 600 nautical miles, and a minimum payload of 35 pounds while ideally allowing for 100 pounds.

It should have automatic target recognition and autonomous terminal guidance, and be “ideally mission-proven” to function in jamming and GPS-denied environments. This includes “Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) or redundant navigation capabilities suitable for GPS/GNSS-denied operations in maritime and other ‘feature-poor’ environments.”

DIU is also looking for a weapon that doesn’t require any proprietary launch equipment, with “remote and low-signature launch methods strongly preferred.”

Companies should have an “existing production capacity or credible path to producing 100+ systems monthly.” And with a price tag of “cost-per-effect below $500,000 based on system reliability and mission success rate, with a sub-$250,000 all-up flyaway cost at scale.”

In addition to GBAM, the U.S. military is pursuing other strike weapons that don’t cost as much as traditional missiles, and can be mass produced as needed. They include the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles, or FAMM-BAR, program to launch cruise missiles from cargo planes, as well as the Low-Cost Containerized Missiles hypersonic weapons program.

The “Readiness Simulation” project comes as the U.S. government is about to change its draft registration system.

Since 1940, men within a designated age range have been required to register with the Selective Service. But under a proposed rule, men aged 18 to 26 will be automatically registered starting Dec. 19, 2026. The Selective Service System will work off data contained in other federal databases.

Questions remain about how prepared the Selective Service System is to handle the change.

“SSS currently relies on manual analysis, legacy modeling approaches, outdated assumptions, and historical datasets that do not fully reflect modern demographics, communications channels, throughput constraints, or operational readiness conditions,” warned the agency in a Request for Quote for the Readiness Simulation tool.

The deadline for vendors to propose their simulation models is Aug. 14.

The computer simulation will explore multiple areas. These include evaluating staffing and resource requirements, comparing mobilization and police scenarios and assessing the operational impact of surge conditions. In addition, the system will “identify throughput risks, delays, and bottlenecks” and support executive planning and reporting obligations.

The goal is a simulation system that “models the full end-to-end SSS mobilization pipeline, supports configurable scenarios, and provides decision-support analytics necessary for leadership, planners, and operators.”

Scenarios will encompass draft registration, selection, notification, delivery and classification. They will also cover the Alternative Service Program, which includes various forms of community service as well as conscientious objectors.

Computer models will “represent MEPS [Military Entrance Processing Stations] throughput, no-shows, medical disqualification rates, claims processing, and ASP diversion,” according to the Request for Quote.

Contractors must be prepared to run the Readiness Simulation while “recognizing that legacy SSS draft data may be outdated or unreliable,” the agency said.

A draft registration system based on data compiled by — and accessed from — other federal agencies is likely to raise privacy concerns.

The computer simulation “shall operate within an SSS-designated cloud environment, use anonymized aggregate data, and support complete Government ownership and sustainment,” the agency said.

The simulation must also comply with multiple privacy regulations.

The Navy recently published a Sources Sought notice for a massive, multi-award contract — worth up to $30 billion — for the multi-mission dry dock.

The dock is part of the Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, which aims to modernize the service’s four long-neglected shipyards at Portsmouth, Virginia, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Kittery, Maine, as well as the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility. The contract is for five years plus three one-year options.

“The Multi-Mission Dry Dock is a fully pressure-relieved dry dock capable of accommodating shipyard repair services for the newest Ford-class aircraft carrier, Nimitz-class carriers, and other surface and subsurface ships served by PSNS & IMF,” according to the Sources Sought notice.

The project was spurred by the need to service Ford-class carriers on the West Coast.

“The Navy does not currently have the capacity and capability to perform depot-level maintenance on a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier in the Pacific Northwest,” according to the Navy’s Multi-Mission Dry Dock website.

The capability to even service older carriers is limited at Puget Sound: “The only dry dock on the West Coast able to accommodate a current Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is Dry Dock 6 (DD6), which does not meet seismic resiliency standards and cannot fully accommodate Ford-class carriers,” the site reads.

The multiple-award construction contract, or MACC, includes several task orders that typically range between $2 billion and $6 billion each. However, there may be smaller task orders for early contractor involvement and alternative technical concepts.

“The focus of this MACC will be the construction of a new proposed Multi-Mission Dry Dock at PSNS & IMF, located at Naval Base Kitsap (NBK) Bremerton, Washington,” the Sources Sought notice said. Located within the existing Dry Dock 3 and Piers 6 and 7, the project includes “dry dock drainage, dewatering, and flooding systems; a caisson; roadways and rail networks; portal crane track; access and egress elements; mechanical, electrical, and communications systems; support buildings; and utility routing tunnels. The proposed project also includes demolition of facilities and utilities.”

The Navy expects the first task order to include dredging, as well as work on piers, buildings and utilities. The second task order will see demolition of Dry Dock 3 and construction of the multi-mission dry dock. Task order three will provide infrastructure, such as electrical substations, utility tunnels and building crane rails. Task order four will be for the dock caisson.

Puget Sound has been a fixture for the Navy for more than a century.

It began in 1891, when the Navy bought 190 acres for $10,000 (about $367,000 today) to create Naval Station Puget Sound. The station became a shipyard in 1900 and was the Navy’s only West Coast repair facility until 1941.

“Between 1917 and 1969, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard constructed a total of 85 ships, including the largest vessels on the West Coast,” the Navy said.

The goal is to “identify industry partners capable of providing a Ground-Based Launcher solution to protect United States Air Force assets,” according to a Request for Information submitted by the service. The request has a response deadline of Aug. 6.

The RFI lists requirements that suggest an air defense system that can handle a variety of threats. In addition to intercepting cruise missiles, the Air Force wants missiles that can destroy drones ranging in size from Group 1 (maximum gross takeoff weight of less than 21 pounds) to Group 5 (maximum weight of more than 1,320 pounds).

This would mean a single system that could stop everything from a small kamikaze drone to a giant Global Hawk-sized UAV.

The query comes as U.S. and allied military bases in the Middle East have been struck hard by Iranian drones and missiles.

Iranian weapons destroyed a valuable U.S. E-3 Sentry AWACS, damaged at least five KC-135 tankers at Saudi airbases and devastated multiple air defense radars.

Likewise, Russia and Ukraine have been hammering each other with waves of drones and missiles that overwhelm air defenses and deplete stockpiles of interceptors.

Not surprisingly, the Air Force wants a defense system with plenty of ammunition. Contractors are asked to “outline operational performance metrics, specifically the firing rate across all magazines and the total magazine depth, while demonstrating seamless command and control (C2) system integration for rapid sensor data dissemination and weapons cueing.”

The RFI suggests a desire for a self-contained system that is easily transportable, uses a laser illuminator for fire control and possesses integrated sensing capabilities. The RFI lists 11 “critical baseline attributes” for the Ground-Based Launcher, including cost, transportability, manpower requirements and built-in testing diagnostics for maintenance and safety.

As background, contractors are asked to refer to the 2012 Joint Staff publication JP 3-01, “Countering Air and Missile Threats.”

Even before the Iran War, the defense of Air Force bases spurred debate. Last year, a strategist on the Air Staff argued that the Air Force should stop relying on the Army for primary air defense of airfields.

He warned that expeditionary airbases lack sophisticated systems like the Patriot, and that the Air Force’s own security forces are poorly equipped for air defense.

In addition to problems stemming from both the destroyers and the missiles, the Navy and Army are reportedly not coordinating work on the joint Conventional Prompt Strike missile program. Missile flight testing scheduled for 2025 has been pushed back to 2027.

“Despite recent successes testing the CPS missile, the Navy faces several programmatic challenges associated with developing, delivering, and deploying the CPS missile on the DDG-1000,” warned the Government Accountability Office report. “These challenges include rising costs, schedule delays, reliability issues with DDG-1000 class destroyers, and CPS production challenges, among other things.”

In search of a mission for the DDG-1000 after escalating costs and capability concerns resulted in the program being cut from 32 ships to just three, the Navy decided in 2022 to arm the Zumwalts with CPS boost-glide hypersonic missiles. CPS uses a two-stage booster to loft a high-altitude glider that can hit a target thousands of miles away in 30 minutes or less.

Two Zumwalts have been delivered, and the third is scheduled for 2028. In addition, CPS missiles will arm Virginia-class attack submarines, while the Army uses a land-based version called the Land-Range Hypersonic Weapon.

However, modifications to the destroyers — such as installing hypersonic missiles and vertical launch tubes — has added costs and delays.

One ship, for example, needed “more cabling than was anticipated in the initial project design, as the contractor cut and removed more cabling than planned from the forward part of the ship for CPS missile launch tube installation,” GAO noted.

In addition, “the DDG-1000 class ships have unique systems, such as its radar, combat, and network systems, that are costly and difficult to sustain and maintain,” GAO said.

The Zumwalts suffer from unreliable power systems and difficulty in obtaining spare parts.

Despite some successful flight tests from land facilities, the CPS missile has also run into problems.

The cost of the missiles has risen sharply: a 2020 Navy estimate of $31 billion for 262 missiles has mushroomed into $41 billion for 224 missiles.

“Lockheed Martin, the CPS missile body prime contractor responsible for production integration, faces significant production issues that it must address to build the missiles at anticipated rates and costs,” said GAO.

There have been problems with heat-resistant coatings, substandard parts and insufficient production capacity, with the factory only capable of producing six or seven missiles a year instead of the desired 12.

Building the CPS missile has also proved too complex for some workers.

“According to Navy and Army program officials, the work instructions are largely written as engineering specifications, which the contractor provides to workers who have recently graduated from high school or vocational school,” the GAO report noted. “Navy production oversight officials said that it is unreasonable to expect workers to understand the instructions provided.”

In theory, the Army should have an easier time with its LRHW missile, which mainly differs from CPS in the launcher. Rather than the cold-gas ejection system that pops CPS from a tube before ignition, LRHW uses a hot-launch system.

However, GAO pointed out a concerning lack of coordination between the two services. For example, while the Navy is responsible for production of the missile body, the Army used its own consultant to study how to increase production.

Thus, “the Navy cannot make decisions in isolation since the Army is buying its own missiles and manages key aspects of production,” the report concluded. Without a joint development and procurement strategy, “the Navy and the Army create the potential for both additional delay and inefficient use of taxpayer funds.”