Demand for exquisite munitions has skyrocketed as conflicts in Iran and Ukraine — and an ever-tense Indo-Pacific — continue to redefine stockpile demand.

So, too, has there developed an insatiable market for cheap systems and interceptors capable of balancing scales that, in regions like the Middle East, have been encumbered by cost-per-kill ratios as lopsided as 114-1 — in the case of a PAC-3 interceptor versus a Shahed-136 drone.

If that weren’t enough to consider, there’s the lightning-quick speed of AI integration and unmanned systems into formations, and the reality of having to rethink a simple concept — hiding — that was seldom given a second thought due to the total air superiority of the Global War on Terror.

Such frenzied developments, meanwhile, come against a backdrop of new Pentagon policy that aims to eliminate the antiquated red tape of the acquisition process and speed development to the battlefield.

A daunting cluster of problems to solve, no doubt. But if encountering such a catalog of to-dos is stress-inducing, one would not know it when speaking to U.S. Army Under Secretary Mike Obadal, who finds himself at the center of many of these discussions.

From his office and out on the trail, Obadal oversees the service’s business operations, acquisition strategy, and manpower and personnel systems, among myriad other duties.

Obadal assumed the position after a stint in the private sector, which followed a military career that included time as a Special Operations officer, the status of Master Army Aviator and qualifications in nine different aircraft.

Obadal spoke to Military Times about how he and the Army are approaching these seismic shifts in warfighting philosophy, and how this year’s AUSA exposition reflects the blistering pace of innovation that catalyzes them.

There are many examples of individuals without military experience working in consequential positions within the Pentagon. You are not one. How has your military experience shaped how you approach this role?

What I try very hard to do is not let my experience drive the way I do things. I want it to inform the way I do things, whether that’s my experience working with the interagency and seeing how other executive branch agencies operate, my experience in the conventional military or in other parts of the military, doing joint work, working with partners and allies or going out into corporate America.

I don’t want any one of those things to be the driver of how I make decisions and conduct myself in the business of the Army, but I do want all of it to come together and inform it.

So, it’s certainly very helpful for me when I talk to soldiers or when I look at programs or weapon systems.

The biggest thing it helps me with is understanding that there’s no single weapon system that operates by itself anywhere. They are all part of a joint force, and within that, you have a maneuver Army that is reliant — tanks are reliant on infantry, infantry is reliant on fires, all of it is reliant on aviation, medical and logistics.

All those components work together as a chain, and you have to make sure every link in the chain is as strong as possible.

That’s one of the biggest things that I take away from being in the military: an understanding that all of these things have to work in synergy, and there are no easy solutions.

We continue to watch the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran unfold. What do you expect to see at an event like AUSA that reflects what America has learned from them?

If you walk around the hall at AUSA, it’ll give you a good indication of the Army’s priorities. Our priorities are reflected in what we’re procuring.

Going back several years, when we were in the Middle East and we first saw adversary drones — counter-drone systems became a really important topic. It kind of started in the special operations and then expanded into the larger Army.

Ukraine has not just reinforced that counter-UAS is a critical part of operations today; it’s cemented it.

So, if you walk around AUSA, you’re going to see an immense number of not only drones but also counter-UAS. That’s a reflection of the procurement and the budget, not just in the Army but in the Pentagon.

That’s number one. Number two is software. Being able to see, sense and integrate to understand what your positional advantage is, and understand the adversary and their vulnerabilities.

That’s just military operations, but today it’s looking at how we apply the best sensors and best software to bring all of that together to give decision advantage to our commanders.

The third one is fires, and when you look at current conflicts, the importance of long-range precision fires is highlighted.

So, what you’ll also see at the conference is a reflection of our investment portfolio in our magazine depth, but also the variety of munitions.

Expanding out the optionality that commanders have beyond just one or two exquisite munitions, with everything from longer-range artillery, one-way attack and loitering munitions, up into our higher-end missiles.

All of those represent our fires portfolio, but that’s just for offensive operations. When we get into the defensive side, we’ll be seeing everything from ballistic missiles down to Group One drones.

If you look at those three areas — drones and counter-UAS; software and sensors; and the fires portfolio — and were to roll back the clock to AUSA 10 years ago, the difference is remarkable.

At that time, the focus was very vehicle-centric, armor-centric, pieces of kit for individual soldiers. All of those things are important and are continuing to advance, but these newer investment areas represent a noticeable shift in warfare.

These conflicts are obviously influencing the speed of acquisition. But that process includes an emphasis on both cost-friendly and exquisite munition stockpiles. What is the best balance to ensure success?

The conflicts are definitely influencing and accelerating the way the Army — and certainly the broader Department — are innovating, prototyping, procuring and then fielding different capabilities.

If you were to roll back a decade or even less, you would see very traditional models that go from experimentation into writing an initial requirement document, then into prototyping, then selection, then low-rate production and then finally into fielding and high-rate production.

That’s years long. That process is very deliberate, and it built our military to where it is today, which is still the most dominant, but with a number of vulnerabilities because of technical innovation in the commercial market that adversaries are able to take advantage of.

So, where can we compress this cycle and get it more into a process where we ask the commercial industry to experiment on their dime?

A lot of this has to do with private capital being interested in the defense market. They’re making a bet that they can get through some of the experimentation, and then we can follow on with prototyping and quickly get into low-rate and high-rate production before fielding.

Fielding then allows us to get immediate feedback that goes back into industry. That is essentially what had to happen in Ukraine because it’s existential to them.

So, when we say wartime footing, Ukraine is on the ultimate wartime footing, and there are lessons to draw from there. What are the unnecessary steps in the acquisition process? Where can you smartly accept risk?

Probably one of the biggest drivers of speeding things up is acknowledging that we’re willing to accept risk. We know that if we get a tighter innovation cycle, we’re accepting more risk on the battlefield, but we’re also driving down risk on the battlefield because we’re getting it to them much sooner.

So, then we get into how that translates to fires. Exquisite versus low cost. It’s a balance, or a high-low mix, essentially, where we have to have both offensive and defensive exquisite weapons.

We have to have certain stockpiles to be able to counter the exquisite weapons of our adversaries and have our own effects. Then you get into mass, which comes when we start going beyond the first few days of a conflict, and we’re in protraction. We have to have affordable mass. The cost curve needs to come back in our favor.

While balancing the above, how much of a difference has the surge in domestic manufacturing made in having these pre-positioned elements assisting efforts?

A massive difference.

The Infantry Squad Vehicle is a perfect example. That’s a Chevy Colorado chassis; the drivetrain and suspension are a little different, but it’s nothing unusual.

Essentially, it then goes to a detailer that puts the military-specific equipment on top of it. It’s everything that we need it to be.

As with anything, it has its vulnerabilities. We’re sacrificing heavy armor and survivability, which we needed throughout the GWOT years, for mobility, transportability and ease of repair.

But using this model also allows us to sustain it far more easily because so many of the components are commercial.

It especially matters when you get into keeping the ISV — or domestically made equipment — in the decades ahead and needing improvements over the years. With the ISV, as Chevy makes improvements to its chassis and drivetrain, that immediately feeds back into the production line of ISVs.

So, we’re now getting upgrades that are just byproducts of the commercial market.

With acquisition, there’s a major emphasis on AI. What are you discussing with tech companies to ensure the human-in-the-loop element equates to maintaining final say despite the speed of the tech?

Every company that deals with this emerging technology and the military is of the same mindset, which is that the human-in-the-loop factor has to be the default.

There are workflows and cycles that human commanders can say, “I need this to run in the background, and I don’t need to see it or be on it.” But when it comes to kinetic kill chains and making decisions on the battlefield, the workflows that enable commanders have to have very hard stops.

It’s not just a commander saying yes or no. It’s far more complicated and nuanced. It’s presenting options based on a tremendous amount of computing analysis and saying, “Here are all the courses of action based on the priorities that you gave, based on the environmental factors that the agents have been able to ingest and all of the long-term planning that goes into it.

That allows the commanders to then take highly complex tasks like mission planning and distill it down into areas where they can consume it more easily, and then apply what only humans can do, which is context and reason.

That context and reason part is what the tech companies that work with us are very focused on enabling, as opposed to taking over entire workflows.

Autonomy is important, really, in three areas when it comes to warfighting.

Think about combat breaching. That’s one of the most dangerous things we ask a human to do: to breach a linear minefield or barrier. If we can automate that, that removes something inherently dangerous.

The second is highly complex, like command and control. How do you distill what would take human staff officers hours or days into seconds, and give a commander not only several options, but the analysis behind it and the confidence in the product being presented?

The third is the ability to remove repetitive and mundane things human soldiers are doing. Resupplying via trucks, for instance. If we can automate that, we are removing that task from our logistics soldiers and allowing them to apply their talents to solving real problems with a clear vision and mindset.

Beyond weapon systems, something as simple as staging — or hiding — equipment or personnel requires a vastly different strategy than even 10 years ago. How does something as simple as saying, “How do we hide this helo?” impact your conversations with industry?

It’s not something that we’ve had to truly consider as an Army for 40 or 50 years because we were guaranteed air superiority.

We don’t have air superiority at this point because of long-range fires and precision targeting from space.

So, you go back to dispersion, displacement of assets and disaggregation of large headquarters. As you remember from recent decades, a division headquarters would be a massive entity with satellite dishes and other assets in the open. Those days are gone.

We now have to consider how we bring in technology from the companies to allow us to displace 10-foot satellite dishes and 20 miles of wire, and actually have small-scale edge compute and transport systems that can disaggregate everyone. That’s incredibly important.

Certainly, camouflage comes into play. Other classified capabilities come into play as well, and that’s all just the visible element. Then you get into electronic warfare and the ability to monitor.

So, how do you disaggregate some of that?

Those are all things that we are actively moving — and coming back to — in a more modern stance.

On Monday, his successor, Acting Army Secretary Adam Telle, took things back to the biblical book of Genesis in his first public speech to troops since assuming the role.

“Controlling land is fundamental to humanity,” he told a packed ballroom at the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting. “The Army does it better than anyone, and it’s on us, the people in this room, to keep it that way. Humanity’s connection to the land is biblical, and it even transcends faith, since the dawn of creation, as recorded in Genesis.”

Telle, who previously served as the assistant secretary of the Army for public works, enlisted the Old Testament to preach a message of simplicity of purpose, invoking the sacred ground of past battlefields and the Army’s long history of protecting American territory.

“It makes me wonder why the United States Army, again the most lethal and dominant institution in human history, struggles to explain in common terms who we are in 2026, who we really are,” Telle said. “We’ve drowned ourselves and the public in buzzwords, strategies, slideshows, government acronyms and bureaucratic doublespeak — things that are advertised as revolutionary. But the Army’s value proposition is actually too fundamental for goofy corporate jargon.”

Though Telle’s rhetorical approach differed from Driscoll’s, he quickly made it clear that the Army was holding the course set by his predecessor, who resigned Aug. 31 over growing disagreements and friction with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Telle hailed the Army’s work to streamline acquisition and reduce roadblocks to getting soldiers the gear they need, citing the Army’s work to reduce service “fiefdoms” from thousands to a few newly named portfolio acquisition executives.

The service, he said, is moving away from what he called “compound self-interest,” or bureaucratic risk avoidance.

“We’re empowering a small number of teams to address our biggest mandates to make difficult trade-offs around speed, manufacturability and supply chain realities early, often and together,” he said. “This is how you generate compound soldier-interest. That’s the opposite of compound self-interest.”

He demonstrated the Pentagon’s new small drones online marketplace, likening it to Amazon.com and showing how soldiers could access it on their smartphones and leave reviews for future soldiers based on how well their gear worked.

Likewise, he compared the Army’s new online test range reservation system for industry, initiated under Driscoll, to the hotel reservation site Booking.com.

The site, he said, is like a “white-glove concierge service that allows innovators to get a reservation on the range faster.”

Officials have previously said the new system can accelerate companies’ range-testing schedules from as much as 18 months to 30 days.

Telle also reasserted the Army’s commitment to what the military has called a “right to repair,” meaning that it will demand open-architecture systems from all future vendors and limit industry’s ability to control intellectual property and charge a premium for fixes and spare parts.

“Right now, we’re sprinting to field low-cost interceptors with open architecture built in from the outset. We need these low-cost interceptors to shoot down missiles and drones headed our way,” Telle said. “We know we need thousands of these things, but they have to seamlessly connect to our network.

“If the data is trapped behind proprietary moats, and we have to call a contractor to decode the data, our superintelligent command and control doesn’t matter,” He continued. “Everything we buy from here on out will have open architecture; it’s non-negotiable.”

A ‘manufacturing rodeo’

Next, he said, the Army will launch a new project: a “manufacturing rodeo,” to be held early next year, that will put the service’s industrial base suppliers in competition with each other.

“We’ve invested a lot in our organic industrial base. Now we need to strain it in the nation’s larger industrial base,” Telle said. “We’re going to stress-test the supply chain, the manufacturing processes and see where it breaks.”

Telle did not provide specifics, such as the precise mechanism for competition or the challenges in which companies would be asked to compete.

“We’re going to learn by doing, not by sitting around postulating at the Pentagon,” he said. “We’re going to find the weak links. We’re going to make them stronger, and we’re going to keep iterating.”

Telle did not refer to Driscoll or allude to the fact that the service has no current Army secretary nominee. He did, however, address the “beautifully chaotic” system of American government, saying that while it wasn’t efficient, it centered human freedom and allowed for creativity and innovation.

“The United States Army laid the groundwork for that, and will continue to guarantee that it’s never extinguished. Meanwhile, the other team’s human spirit, its imagination, is bounded and boxed and regulated,” Telle said. “The United States of America is where the magic happens, where brilliant people turn science fiction into science fact, and you can’t flip a switch to turn that on.

“The Army’s work over the course of history has been so fundamental, so successful that the American spirit it unleashed is now the most important and potent force we have,” he continued. “It’s a potent force that the other guys don’t have.”

The China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center at Ban Keun Airport some 50 kilometers (31 miles) from the Lao capital Vientiane and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy kicked off in September, the Chinese Ministry of Defense said on its website.

China’s role at the military airport, which had just finished major upgrades and features a 2,000-meter runway, suggests that the People’s Liberation Army intends to springboard into other parts of Southeast Asia – a land-border neighbor where several countries have territorial differences with China – experts say.

“As China in reality aspires to be a major power, it has to gradually and in a low-key manner build up military bases, albeit for training or other seemingly innocuous purposes,” said Oh Ei Sun, principal adviser at the Pacific Research Center think tank in Kuala Lumpur.

“Laos has long been considered to be a close ally for (China) in Southeast Asia and it is of course no surprise that China’s first base in Southeast Asia is located there,” he added.

The two countries share a border, a Communist Party leadership and a recent history of economic cooperation led by large Chinese infrastructure projects such as a railway line.

The defense ministry in Beijing said the training center, to be jointly maintained and operated, is aimed at helping Laos strengthen the training of its air force pilots.

Ban Keun will allow a “continuous” Chinese presence and primarily be used to “steer procurement to Chinese equipment” and support PLA air operations, the China Global South Project media platform says in a study.

The ministry website says China’s role at the airport is “not directed against any third party”, contributing instead to improving “practical military cooperation.”

But instead, China may be increasing its military foothold “deep inside mainland Southeast Asia” after earlier establishing a naval presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, said Nguyen Thanh Trung, a political scientist at Fulbright University in Vietnam. Mainland Southeast Asia includes Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand as well as Laos and Cambodia.

Chinese operational military presence and privileged access at the Cambodian base grew from 2019 through 2025, Asian mainstream media reports have said.

China is keen on Laos now “because the Chinese feel it’s time to complement the naval facility in Cambodia with nearby air power capability,” said Denny Roy, a ­senior fellow at the East-West Centre think tank in Hawaii.

Using both its navy and air force, Beijing has shored up its South China Sea claims over the past two decades by building artificial islands, often for military use. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam dispute parts of the sea with China.

Sporadic China-Vietnam incidents have occurred in the waters since the 1970s. China and the Philippines are jousting for control over tiny islets west of Luzon and Palawan islands.

“Vietnam is probably the most sensitive, as Laos has long been its strategic buffer, and for now the foothold looks more like China asserting leverage over Hanoi and Phnom Penh,” said Hangyu Lee, East Asia Pacific analyst at the nonprofit organization Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. He said Ban Keun and Ream “together could look like a wider Chinese security network.”

Myanmar, Lee added, could be “indirectly affected” if the airport improves China’s ability to monitor activity across continental Southeast Asia. Myanmar, with its own Chinese border, has been in civil war since 2021.

China’s presence at the Laotian airport has been linked to its first confirmed overseas base, in the East African country Djibouti. The People’s Liberation Army uses it as a support base. The African base and now Ban Keun mark China’s gradual, low-key buildup of bases, Oh said.

But the Laotian site “represents a new air-centered model” distinct from Djibouti and Ream in Cambodia, the China Global South Project study says.

“Eventually it can be a pre-positioned base for PRC aircraft as needed,” Roy said. “It could also be expanded to accommodate more and larger aircraft.”

The $6.3 billion contract, which provides two additional option years, will see Raytheon provide the Defense Department with a continuous supply of Standard Missile-3 Block IB interceptors manufactured primarily in Tucson, Arizona and Huntsville, Alabama.

“SM-3 Block IB has proven its relevance in combat and this contract helps ensure we can replenish inventories and keep pace with the evolving threats the U.S. Navy, MDA and their partners face around the world,” Raytheon President Phil Jasper said in a statement.

The SM-3 Block IB interceptor belongs to a larger family of “hit-to-kill” SM-3 missile interceptors, which seek and destroy incoming ballistic missiles using sheer speed and momentum.

The Block IB type can be used by land forces and ships and is frequently deployed on vessels due to its range and highly flexible steering. The interceptor tracks flying targets with a two-color infrared seeker and propels itself towards them in short bursts, giving it accuracy at high speed as it homes in on targets.

It is designed to knock short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles out of the sky when they are halfway to hitting their targets, and has long striking reach. It was used in combat for the first time in 2024 when the U.S. Navy destroyers USS Arleigh Burke and USS Carney fired them to intercept Iranian missiles aimed at targets in Israel.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies named the SM-3 Block IB among “seven critical munitions” in an April report detailing ammunition shortages, alongside Patriot missiles, Precision Strike Missiles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and others.

The contract for more SM-3 Block IBs, announced by Raytheon on Thursday, was among five framework agreements the defense giant signed with the Pentagon this February.

The deal comes at a time when the DoD is seeking to avert diminishing munitions stockpiles. National security specialists, defense analysts and foreign policy pundits cautioned in March that the U.S. military’s increased use of missile interceptors during the war with Iran poses strategic risks to integral defense capabilities if fighting spills into a long-term conflict.

Raytheon stated in its release that the contract for SM-3 Block IB supply “supports urgent replenishment of missile defense inventory that has been successfully used in combat and remains central to protecting U.S. forces, allies and critical infrastructure.”

If carried out as planned, death penalty experts said it would mark the first known broadcast or livestream of a lawful execution.

Executions are generally conducted behind prison walls, and internet platforms and governments have spent years trying to limit the circulation of violent execution footage.

Has a lawful execution ever been livestreamed or broadcast to the public before?

Death penalty experts consulted by Reuters said they were unaware of any previous lawful execution that had been livestreamed or broadcast to a public audience.

Execution footage has occasionally emerged after the event. The hanging of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2006, for example, was seen around the world after official and unofficial recordings circulated online and through broadcasters, though it was not shown live.

Broadcasts and livestreams today are common for court proceedings, parliamentary debates and other state functions, but not for judicial executions.

How unusual is this compared with modern execution practices around the world?

Public executions have become rare worldwide, with most countries that retain the death penalty carrying out executions away from public view.

According to Amnesty International, public executions recorded in recent years have largely been concentrated in Iran and Taliban-run Afghanistan.

The execution would also be notable in the United States. Public executions largely disappeared during the 20th century, and death penalty experts cited by Reuters said the last legally sanctioned public execution took place in 1936.

Hasan’s execution would be the first carried out by firing squad by the U.S. military since the 1945 execution of Eddie Slovik, who was convicted of desertion during World War II.

How has the internet changed the circulation of execution footage?

The internet has transformed execution imagery from a local event into content capable of reaching global audiences within minutes.

Militant groups, such as the Islamic State, became notorious for producing professionally edited execution videos that were distributed online as propaganda and recruitment tools.

Criminal organisations, including Mexican drug cartels, have also circulated violent footage to intimidate rivals and project power.

The ability of users to rapidly copy, repost and redistribute content has made it more difficult for governments and technology companies to control the spread of such material.

What has been the reaction from governments and tech companies?

Governments and technology companies have generally moved in the opposite direction, attempting to reduce rather than expand access to graphic execution footage.

Major social media platforms have spent years removing execution videos linked to extremist organisations and other violent groups.

One of the first public governmental reactions came from New Zealand, whose chief censor said authorities would have little practical ability to prevent residents from accessing a livestream while it was taking place.

Livestreams pose particular challenges for platforms because footage can be viewed, copied and redistributed before moderation systems can intervene.

Even countries that still conduct public executions have often restricted filming and broadcast rights. Saudi Arabia historically carried out public executions before spectators, but recording them was prohibited, and such public executions had largely ceased by 2019.

Hasan, a former Army psychiatrist, is set to become the first person to be executed by firing squad by the U.S. military since 1945, shortly after the end of World War II.

The Pentagon official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, did not offer more information and said details would follow.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth earlier told the Human Events Daily podcast he planned to make Hasan’s execution public, according to video of his comments posted on social media on Thursday.

Hegseth said deciding to execute Hasan by firing squad at Fort Hood on a Thursday at 1 p.m. — the approximate time, day of the week and location of Hasan’s shooting — was a “no-brainer.”

“We’ll make sure that people are able to watch it, that it’s public. Because people need to understand that … there’s serious consequences for these types of things,” Hegseth said.

Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell announced Monday that Hegseth had recommended death by Army firing squad for Hasan, and President Donald Trump approved the decision.

“He killed 13 people and wounded 32 others while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attack,” Parnell wrote.

The date and location were announced Wednesday.

“The execution of Nidal Hasan by firing squad will take place at Fort Hood, Texas, on Thursday, December 3rd, 2026, at 1 p.m. CT.,” acting Army Secretary Adam Telle announced, confirming that the location would return Hasan to the site of the murders.

If the date and method of execution are carried out, it would mark the first such case for the service since Jan. 31, 1945, when Pvt. Eddie D. Slovik was executed by a U.S. Army firing squad in France for desertion during World War II.

The last death sentence carried out by the U.S. military was in 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed by hanging at the gallows in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after he was convicted of raping and attempting to kill a young girl.

Hasan, who was born in northern Virginia, walked into a Fort Hood readiness processing center on Nov. 5, 2009, and opened fire using a semi-automatic handgun. Thirteen people were killed, including a pregnant soldier.

At his court-martial, Hasan, now 56, admitted to the shooting, and in 2013, said he carried out the attack in support of the Taliban.

Hasan was convicted by a military jury in August 2013, which recommended he be sentenced to death. He was subsequently transferred to Fort Leavenworth, where he has been incarcerated on death row.

Speaking at a hearing before the congressionally created National Commission on the Future of the Navy on Thursday, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James Kilby said the Navy faced difficulties that weren’t all immediately visible when it came to sustaining and resetting after such combat demands.

“That’s the piece I think that we need to be better at articulating and demonstrating — what the cost of this extension will be two years from now,” Kilby said. “So people see that, and they sign that bill.”

Referencing Hegseth’s commendation of sailors on the Lincoln for their successful 321-day deployment, of which they spent 265 consecutive days without a port call, Kilby acknowledged that the crew had “delivered the goods.”

“So, it’s a little bit of a challenge for me to say you can’t do this when we keep delivering,” he said.

But, he said, readiness rates remain “artificially high” amid the combat surge because ships remain deployed or have yet to return to maintenance. When that happens, Kilby indicated, the “little bit of a false positive” readiness picture will change rapidly.

“The problem will come when eventually they do come home. The industrial base will not be able to swallow that pill, and so we’ll have to sequence that,” he said.

A standard solution to account for the additional cost: deferring maintenance.

“I’ll either squish the package into the bare minimum and not do modernization things I need to do, so that’s the bill that’s being paid there,” Kilby said.

Unmanned vessels, he added, present a promising future solution, but still one that’s a way off.

“When we get a combatant commander that’s willing to ask for a tailored force package, think a [littoral combat ship], an unmanned air vessel, and some unmanned surface vessels to do monitoring and maritime domain awareness and potentially action, it alleviates the request for him to ask for a strike group or an amphibious ready group. That will help,” Kilby said. “But that’s a long time coming because they don’t see that offer on the menu right now. We’ve got to act on that and produce that thing for them to ask for it.”

He suggested that a cultural change to give service leaders and key commanders more flexibility in how they meet requirements would help to sustain long-term readiness.

“They have very, very little flexibility in their basic phase to get through those gates, and we’re pressurizing that by saying, ‘Do it faster, so I can count you as combat-surge ready,’” Kilby said, “which prevents them from maybe doing some things that existed in what I maybe fondly remember from my youth, where we had a little bit more control of that culture.”

For now, Kilby said, the Navy is “in a system” where the geographic combatant commander is given a problem to address and will ask for whatever they need from the services to meet the requirement. The services, in turn, will do whatever it takes to meet the requirement, despite future costs.

“I think it’s a tough pill for us to swallow, because the Navy’s strength, the Navy and Marine Corps’ strength, is our weakness in that regard,” he said.

Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., visited the Middle East this week on a Congressional Delegation trip, speaking with Gulf region leaders and visiting American facilities to assess damage done by the Iran war. Murphy was denied access to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, which had suffered damage from drone strikes during the conflict.

“They are using every tool they can, including withholding information about damages, slow walking the pace of reports about casualties and denying us access to see the damage as part of a campaign of cover-up, so as to mask the true cost of the war,” Murphy told reporters on Thursday.

The “unprecedented” base denial prepared Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Defense Appropriations Committee, in the coming days to draft language that would explicitly require the Department of Defense to grant members of Congress access to military bases overseas under all circumstances if needed.

“I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to pass between now and the end of the year, but I think that’ll be a really important part of the discussion around an appropriations bill next year and the defense authorization bill,” he said during the press call.

Prior to his trip, Murphy requested access to the base through a letter and direct appeal to U.S. Central Command leadership. But he was denied access even as the Department of State supported his trip to the region, with the Defense Department saying it was due to previously imposed travel restrictions.

“Senator Murphy’s office was informed before his trip to the Middle East that he would not receive Department of War support to access Al Udeid Air Base, consistent with the Secretary of War’s directive on travel restrictions in the region ordered on March 3, 2026,” a senior Defense Department official told Military Times on Thursday.

“That decision was communicated in advance by the Office of the Secretary of War for Legislative Affairs,” the official continued. “The Department applies the Secretary’s guidance evenly.”

In early March, the State and Defense departments issued travel guidance, calling on Americans to depart areas in the region and updating its travel advisory to recommend against visiting certain countries, including Qatar.

“It is absolutely ordinary for members of Congress to travel to areas of conflict and get to talk directly to the military leaders and the soldiers that are involved in the conflict and see for ourselves the damage that has been done to our bases and equipment,” Murphy said, highlighting how during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars he was able to visit operating bases.

He argued that since Congress decides funding and authorization for war, it is necessary to see the consequences, but he was unable to visit Al Udeid or have a briefing on the war with American military officials while in the region.

On the same day the travel advisory was issued in March, the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was hit ​by two Iranians drones, resulting in building damage and a fire. Murphy said that the drones impacted multiple floors of the embassy and part of the space is now “uninhabitable” with permanent damage.

The U.S. previously announced in 2023 plans to build a new embassy compound in Riyadh, which Murphy attributes the lack of repairs to.

Even though no injuries or casualties were reported from the strike, Murphy said that if the attack happened during the day it would have killed many Americans.

“[Secretary of Defense Pete] Hegseth is determined to hide the cost and the consequences of this war from the American public, and it is absolutely outrageous that I and Republican senators are being denied the ability to see the damage for ourselves,” he said.

The previously undisclosed report, completed in May, made a series of safety recommendations and said the key factor was two broken radio transmissions resulting in the helicopter crew not receiving critical details from air traffic control.

The report also found a number of other issues, including technical issues with the Black Hawk and a pattern of helicopter crews failing to fly semiannual minimum hours. It said many helicopters in the Army battalion — including the one in the January 2025 collision — did not have Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance systems.

The report also said Army work with the Federal Aviation Administration on helicopter incidents in the Washington area before the collision was lacking and a working group “did not discuss airspace violations, near-miss reports, or pilot deviations.”

National Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy said in an Oct. 1 letter to the Army that it had made significant progress in addressing its recommendations from the collision. It added, however, that it needed to do more work as “the Army’s aviation safety system failed to consistently detect, interpret, and act on signals of latent hazards, resulting in degraded safety assurance, organizational learning, and safety culture.”

The NTSB report on the crash in January found a series of failures by the FAA were largely responsible for the deadliest U.S. aviation disaster in more than two decades.

The Army report noted that the helicopter was not providing key safety location data, known as ADS-B Out, due to improper maintenance. After the incident, the Army issued an urgent safety message to inspect all Army aircraft transponders to ensure ADS-B Out functionality, and all 3,600 Army helicopters were inspected by July 2025.

The report also noted the Army had not addressed issues that led to the helicopter providing inaccurate altitude data and proposed a series of recommendations to address the issue. It also said the Army needs more advanced night vision equipment for pilots.

The Army report also faulted FAA air traffic control for using “non-standard terminology for directing air traffic and providing incomplete traffic advisories.”

The FAA did not immediately comment. The Army said in a statement on Thursday that it has implemented stronger training and surveillance checks and completed new helicopter safety inspections and testing on altitude awareness. It also said it was pursuing an FAA data-sharing agreement to help identify potential midair collision risks.

The report also called for improved training for military pilots around Washington and Baltimore commercial airports and for reviews of Army helicopter operations near major cities in the United States, South Korea, Japan and Germany.

Congress is still debating aviation safety legislation after lawmakers passed competing versions. The family of First Officer Sam Lilley, who was killed in the collision, said the Army report shows “the system failed everyone that night. The Army’s report acknowledges failures involving known altimeter issues, near-miss reporting, training, risk mitigation and safety culture.”

In particular, a Congressional Research Service report, released Tuesday, pointed to the war in Ukraine, where armored vehicles have largely been driven from the battlefield by unmanned aerial vehicles and guided munitions.

“As ACVs are intended to provide organic, direct fire support to dismounted Marines in the attack, how vulnerable to these threat systems are ACVs during amphibious operations and when operating ashore to support combat operations?” the research service asked in its report. “Are the Marines considering additional ACV survivability modifications based on lessons learned in Ukraine?”

In fact, the Marine Corps did award a contract last month to Anduril for a counter-UAS system to protect the ACV from small drones. Anduril’s Pulsar-L is a sensor and jammer package designed to stop small Group 1 and 2 radio-frequency drones.

“The system is currently in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” noted the Marine contract award.

The Congressional Research Service also questioned whether a possible plan to expand the Marine Corps would, in turn, require more ACVs, which cost about $6 million each, depending on the variant.

Last month, a Force Structure Review suggested adding more than 6,500 personnel by 2032, including additional slots in 19 infantry battalions and two Littoral Combat Teams.

If the plan is implemented, “would additional ACVs be required to accommodate growth in Marine infantry units?” CRS asked.

The ACV comes in multiple variants, including the ACV-P troop carrier, ACV-C command vehicle, ACV-30 fire support model armed with a 30mm cannon, and the ACV-R armored recovery vehicle.

Initially, the Marines envisioned buying 1,122 ACVs. But the current plan is for 608 vehicles, comprising 389 ACV-P, 33 ACV-C, 152 ACV-30 and 34 ACV-R, Marine Corps officials told CRS.

BAE was just awarded a $230 million contract modification for 32 ACV-Rs, which will be the final ACV variant. The order is scheduled to be fulfilled by November 2028.

For fiscal 2027, the Navy is requesting $237 million for ACV upgrades.

The ACV has already experienced teething pains. After two ACVs tipped over in 2022 while operating in surf up to 10 feet high, the Marines briefly suspended ACV operations in the open ocean, as long as significant breaker height doesn’t exceed four feet.

One issue is the weight of the ACV, which now stands at around 35 tons. In 2025, a Navy Small Business Innovation Research solicitation called for reducing the weight of all ACV variants, and particularly the heavier ACV-30 and ACV-R. The goal is to slim down at least 2,000 pounds per vehicle.

“Components identified as having potential for weight reduction include engine access covers, drive shafts, ramp door, ramp, hatches, external fuel tanks, external metallic and metallic/composite add-on-armor components, suspension, turret exterior panels, and bow plane,” the 2025 solicitation stated.

Saltwater corrosion of ACV struts has also created problems.

“The high deployment schedule combined with the high training tempo of the United States Marine Corps creates an extremely corrosive environment for the ACV not typically experienced by other vehicles,” claimed a January 2026 Sources Sought notice for more than 5,000 corrosion-resistant struts.

In addition, the weight reduction SBIR specified that any solution “must address corrosion issues expected from use in and around salt water. Weight reduction will improve fuel efficiency and can lower the Center of Gravity and Center of Buoyancy.”